## 1NC

### Off

**A role of the ballot calling for the liberation of the oppressed is symptomatic of heroism – the ballot becomes a symbol of the prize of Otherness while ontologically erasing the subaltern – the affirmative distances themselves from those they invoke – they view the subaltern through a kaleidoscopic lens while sitting comfortably in this air conditioned simulacra we call the debate round - their simultaneous advocacy of assisting the other and defending the system that bombs them regularly proves their distance. This knowledge production is not just useless neutrality but rather the lynchpin of the Western intellectual subject – any argument the affirmative makes about how the subaltern would totally be on-board with their project relies on the same logic that reinforces conceptions of the inferior Other – a ballot for the affirmative is giving the subaltern a cordectomy**

**Spivak 88** (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture,* 1988“Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, *azp*)

SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary — not only by ideological and scientiﬁc production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the ﬁnal determinant or the transcendental signiﬁed. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redeﬁnition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redeﬁnition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualiﬁed as inadequate to their task or insufﬁ- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientiﬁcity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . .

**Isn’t it off-putting that the affirmative merely expresses solidarity with the oppressed yet does little to nothing to actually relieve their oppression? – What do you think their endless theories, intellectual movements, and speech acts actually DO to resolve anything? – the answer is absolutely nothing – they aren’t subversive, nor radical, nor even that interesting – their speech act is an intellectual façade designed to avoid having to resolve oppression**

**Raskin 99** (Marcus Raskin, Professor of Public Policy at George Washington University, 1999, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall)

As I have noted, world social categories and knowledge systems have changed so that they now see the colonized as human beings. The shifting in social categories, often by those who are the radicals and liberals of the privileged groups, created deep divisions between reality and its description. But this has not necessarily resulted in fundamental affirmative change. For those who were consigned to the role of slave, serf and oppressed by imperial Western nations, it may be disconcerting, but pleasantly surprising, that some leading international lawyers and intellectuals stand with those movements that take their strength from the dispossessed, wretched and exploited, whether in war or peace. Even though these idealists are educated in Western and imperial categories of social reality, they have, nonetheless, taken as their task the reconstruction and transformation of international law as it is understood in the United States. The skeptical are permitted their doubts, however. After all, what can those who represent the pain of others, and only indirectly their own, do to ameliorate the pain of misery sanctioned by imperial law? **What do such a band of idealists dare to teach to those who suffer, especially when that suffering is often caused, directly or indirectly, by the choices made by the very class of which these Western intellectuals and lawyers are members?** Why should the oppressed listen to those educated in a language and thought-pattern which, beneath the honeyed words, are the egocentric and ethnocentric doctrines of the [\*524] dominator? Certainly until decolonization, the abstract meaning of the words were employed as signifiers and killers of the culturally oppressed. The language of description and the mode of argument, the very words themselves, were instruments of the colonizer. Their very rules, laws, precedents and citations acted as a steel-belted noose to stifle the cries of the wretched. And yet, these were the very lessons the colonized needed to learn in order to stand up to the colonizer and survive. Not only did they survive, they pressed on to reform nineteenth and early twentieth century imperial law using the UN, and the International Court of Justice. Most importantly, they effected the consciousness of nations. Nevertheless, the wretched must wonder why, behind claims of universality and universal human rights, our actions and thoughts have an often indeterminate or contradictory effect. For Americans, the reason is a complex one. Americans seek identification with the victim in their dreams, but the reality for the American political and legal class is somewhere between carelessness and negligence of the oppressed worker, toleration for the destruction of other people's cultures for purposes of extraction and commodification, exploiter of their lands, and executioner in counter-revolutions which rain bombs of state and financial terror around the world. So even when some in the United States stand with the victim, they must always wonder, "Who are we that come forward with our notions that speak of human affirmation? Who are we to tell the colonized when independence is a drag on themselves and on others as well, possibly leading to war and internecine conflict?" And the wretched can go further and say, "You have recognized our struggle, taken away our language and substituted your words of understanding, but **now what?** How is freedom to be sustained? We, the formerly marginalized, the indigenous and the merely wretched, have come to recognize that what is presented by the West to humanity as conventional knowledge is a betrayal." In truth, **it was a betrayal by intellectuals and all those who dared to suggest that the twentieth century could be a time of liberation and freedom**. **Education and knowledge as mediated through the colonizer's strainer has left humanity in worse shape than at the beginning of the twentieth century**. For some, the god that really failed them was education/knowledge, which, through its institutions, set itself up as the emancipator. This failure, this sense of futility where knowledge is an instrument of domination for the few, demands recognition.

**The subaltern is subsequently reduced to a fungible object, a passive object for the consumption of the debate community – the affirmative absorbs the power of alterity only to toss its carcass back into the dust**

**Chow 93** (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon, Professor of the Humanities at Brown University, Writing Diaspora: Contemporary Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, Indiana University Press, pg. 12-13.)

In the “cultural studies” of the American academy in the 1990s. The Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way terms such as “oppression,” “victimization,” and “subalternity” are now being used. Contrary to the Orientalist disdain for the contemporary native cultures in the non-West, the Maoist turns the precisely disdained other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralist, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a generalized “subaltern” that is then used to flog an equally generalized “West.” Because the representation of “the other” as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist’s mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker’s own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a “third world intellectual” citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being “victimized” by the structured time at an Ivy League Institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world’s poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical “third worlder representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were “raped” when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self-dramatization all take the route of self-sub-alternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice - the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is no longer distinguishable from those who have had our consciousnesses “raised.”

**This knowledge production is merely an attempt to map out the coordinates of alterity for the targeting computers of our death machines**

**Chow, 6** (Rey Chow, Humanities and Modern Culture & Media Studies at Brown University, 2006 The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work, 40-1)

Often under the modest apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the “scientific” and “objective” production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special “areas” became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target. In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to “know” the other cultures? Can “knowledge” that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare’s accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign “self”/”eye”—the “I”—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that—a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. “Knowledge,” however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences. This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by “the absence of a definable object”—and by “the problem of the vanishing object.”

**The alternative is to vote negative to engage in academic exile – rather than examining structures external to this round, we should question our privilege to speak in the first place – our rejection of the academy is a precondition for any semblance of solvency**

**Biswas, 7** (Shampa BISWAS, Politics @ Whitman, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist,” Millennium 36)

Said has written extensively and poignantly about his own exilic conditions as a Palestinian schooled in the Western literary canon and living in the heart of US empire.27 But more importantly, he has also articulated exile as a ‘style of thought and habitation’ which makes possible certain kinds of ontological and epistemological openings. Speaking of exile as a ‘metaphorical condition’,28 Said describes it as ‘the state of never being fully adjusted’, of ‘always feeling outside’, of ‘restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others’, of ‘a kind of curmudgeonly disagreeableness’. Exile, he says, ‘is the condition that characterizes the intellectual as someone who is a marginal figure outside the comforts of privilege, power, being-at-homeness’.29 Not just ‘foreigners’ but ‘lifelong members of a society’, can be such ‘outsiders’, so that ‘(e)ven if one is not an actual immigrant or expatriate, it is still possible to think as one, to imagine and investigate in spite of barriers, and always to move away from the centralizing authorities towards the margins, where you see things that are usually lost on minds that have never traveled beyond the conventional and comfortable’.30 What Said privileges here is an intellectual orientation, rather than any identarian claims to knowledge; there is much to learn in that for IR scholars. In making a case for the exilic orientation, it is the powerful hold of the nation-state upon intellectual thinking that Said most bemoans.31 The nation-state of course has a particular pride of place in the study of global politics. The state-centricity of International Relations has not just circumscribed the ability of scholars to understand a vast ensemble of globally oriented movements, exchanges and practices not reducible to the state, but also inhibited a critical intellectual orientation to the world outside the national borders within which scholarship is produced. Said acknowledges the fact that all intellectual work occurs in a (national) context which imposes upon one’s intellect certain linguistic boundaries, particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic political constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such restrictions upon the intellectual imagination.32 Comparing the development of IR in two different national contexts – the French and the German ones – Gerard Holden has argued that different intellectual influences, different historical resonances of different issues, different domestic exigencies shape the discipline in different contexts.33 While this is to be expected to an extent, there is good reason to be cautious about how scholarly sympathies are expressed and circumscribed when the reach of one’s work (issues covered, people affected) so obviously extends beyond the national context. For scholars of the global, the (often unconscious) hold of the nation-state can be especially pernicious in the ways that it limits the scope and range of the intellectual imagination. Said argues that the hold of the nation is such that even intellectuals progressive on domestic issues become collaborators of empire when it comes to state actions abroad.34 Specifically, he critiques nationalistically based systems of education and the tendency in much of political commentary to frame analysis in terms of ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ - particularly evident in coverage of the war on terrorism - which automatically sets up a series of (often hostile) oppositions to ‘others’. He points in this context to the rather common intellectual tendency to be alert to the abuses of others while remaining blind to those of one’s own.35 It is fair to say that the jostling and unsettling of the nation-state that critical International Relations scholars have contributed to has still done little to dislodge the centrality of the nation-state in much of International Relations and Foreign Policy analyses. Raising questions about the state-centricity of intellectual works becomes even more urgent in the contemporary context in which the hyperpatriotic surge following the events of 11 September 2001 has made considerable inroads into the US academy. The attempt to make the academy a place for the renewal of the nation-state project is troubling in itself; for IR scholars in the US, such attempts can only limit the reach of a global sensibility precisely at a time when such globality is even more urgently needed. Said warns against the inward pull of patriotism in times of emergency and crisis, and argues that even for an intellectual who speaks for a particular cause, the task is to ‘universalize the crisis, to give greater human scope to what a particular race or nation suffered, to associate that experience with the sufferings of others’.36 He is adamant that this is the case even for beleaguered groups such as the Palestinians whose very survival is dependent on formulating their demands in a nationalist idiom.37 American intellectuals, as members of a superpower with enormous global reach and where dissension in the public realm is noticeably absent, carry special responsibility in this regard.38 What the exilic orientation makes possible is this ability to universalise by enabling first, ‘a double perspective that never sees things in isolation’ so that from the juxtaposition of ideas and experiences ‘one gets a better, perhaps even more universal idea of how to think, say, about a human rights issue in one situation by comparison with another’,39 and second, an ability to see things ‘not simply as they are, but as they have come to be that way’, as contingent ‘historical choices made by men and women’ that are changeable.40 The second of these abilities displaces the ontological givenness of the nation-state in the study of global politics; for the intellectual who feels pulled by the demands of loyalty and patriotism, Said suggests, ‘[n]ever solidarity before criticism’, arguing that it is the intellectual’s task to show how the nation ‘is not a natural or god-given entity but is a constructed, manufactured, even in some cases invented object, with a history of struggle and conquest behind it’.41 The first of these abilities interjects a comparativist approach as critical to the study of global politics, locating one’s work in a temporal and spatial plane that is always larger than one’s immediate (national) context and in the process historicising and politicising what may appear naturalised in any particular (national) context. The now famous passage from Hugo of St Victor, cited by Auerbach, appears in Said’s writings on at least four different occasions: The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong man has extended his love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his.

### Heg

Air power serves to construct a global police system that blurs the line between civilian and target—a failure to strategically reverse aerial power relations causes extinction

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(Mark, “Air power and police power”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2013, volume 31, pages 578 – 593, dml)

Moreover, and more pressingly, we need to understand that from the wider historical perspective of air power **there are no civilian areas and there are no civilians**; the only logic is a police logic. As soon as air power was created the issue was: **what does this do to civilian space?** And, essentially, the answer has been: ‘it destroys it’. Air power thus likewise destroys the concept of the civilian. This was the major theme of the air power literature of the 1920s, found in the work of Mitchell, Seversky, Fuller, and all the others, but the analysis provided in The Command of the Air by Giulio Douhet, first published in 1921, expanded in 1927, and perhaps the first definitive account of the influence of air power on world history, is representative: the art of aerial warfare, notes Douhet, **is the art of** destroying cities**, of** attacking civilians**, of** terrorising the population. In the future, war “will be waged essentially **against the unarmed populations of the cities and great industrial centres**”. There are no longer soldiers and citizens, or combatants and noncombatants: “war is no longer a clash between armies, but **is a clash between nations,** between whole populations.” Aerial bombing means war is now “total war” (Douhet, 2003, pages 11; 158; 223). The major powers fought against accepting this for some time. (Or at least, fought against accepting it in their classic doctrine of war as a battle between militarily industrialised nation-states; the police bombing of colonies was entirely acceptable to them, as we have seen). But eventually, in the course of World War 2 they conceded, and by July 1945 a US Army assessment of strategic air power could openly state that “there are no civilians in Japan” (cited in Sherry, 1987, page 311). **This view has been maintained ever since**: “There are no innocent civilians”, says US General Curtis LeMay (cited in Sherry, 1987, page 287). Recent air power literature on ‘the enemy as a system’ continues this very line.(4) Hence, and contrary to claims made at both ends of the political spectrum that the recent air attacks in Beirut and Gaza reveal “the increasing meaninglessness of the word ‘civilian’ ” (Dershowitz, 2006) or mean that we might be “witnessing … the death of the idea of the civilian” (Gregory, 2006, page 633), it has to be said that **any meaningful concept of ‘the civilian’** **was destroyed** with the very invention of air power (Hartigan, 1982, page 119).(5)

The point is that seen from the perspective of air power as police power, **the use of drone technology over what some would still like to call ‘civilian spaces’** was highly predictable. **This allows us to make a** far more compelling **argument about drones**. For like air power technology in general, **the drone serves as both plane and possibility** (Pandya, 2010, page 143). And what becomes possible with the drone **is permanent police presence across the territory**. “~~Unmanned~~ [unstaffed] aircraft have just revolutionized our ability to provide a constant stare against our enemy”, said a senior US military official. “Using the all-seeing eye, you will find out **who is important in a network, where they live, where they get their support from, where their friends are**” (cited in Barnes, 2009). Much as this might be important geopolitically, with drones being capable of maintaining nonstop surveillance of vast swathes of land and sea for so long as the technology and fuel supplies allow, it is also **nothing less than** the state’s dream ofa perpetual police presence across the territory (Neocleous, 2000). And it is a police presence encapsulated by the process of colonisation, captured in the army document “StrikeStar 2025” which speaks of **the permanent presence of UAVs in the sky as a form of “air occupation”** (Carmichael et al, 1996, page viii).

Drones have been described as the perfect technology for democratic warfare, combining as they do a certain utilitarian character with an appealing ‘risk-transfer’ (Sauer and Schoring, 2012), but perhaps **we need to think of them equally** **as** the perfect technology of liberal police. When in 1943 Disney sought to popularise the idea of ‘victory through air power’, the company probably had little idea just quite what this victory might mean, beyond the defeat of Japan. But if there is a victory through air power to be had on the part of the state it is surely not merely the defeat of a military enemy but the victory of perpetual police.

**Data disproves hegemony impacts**

**Fettweis, 11**

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

The study your Owen evidence cites concludes the opposite way – hegemonic stability is nonsensical

Mack 10 (Andrew Mack, literally the person that they cite in their card, the guy who doesn’t like heg, “The Causes of Peace”) gz

As with other realist claims, there are reasons for skepticism¶ about the peace through preponderance thesis. First, if it were¶ true, we might expect that the most powerful states would¶ experience the least warfare. However, since the end of World¶ War II, the opposite has in fact been the case. Between 1946¶ and 2008, the four countries that had been involved in the¶ greatest number of international conflicts were France, the¶ UK, the US, and Russia/USSR.19 Yet, these were four of the¶ most powerful conventional military powers in the world—¶ and they all had nuclear weapons.¶ The fact that major powers tend to be more involved in¶ international conflicts than minor powers is not surprising.¶ Fighting international wars requires the capacity to project¶ substantial military power across national frontiers and often¶ over very long distances. Few countries have this capacity;¶ major powers have it by definition.¶ But there is a more serious challenge to the preponderance¶ thesis. From the end of World War II until the early 1970s,¶ nationalist struggles against colonial powers were the most¶ frequent form of international conflict. The failure of the far¶ more powerful colonial powers to prevail in these conflicts poses¶ a serious challenge to the core assumptions of preponderance¶ theories—and marked a remarkable historical change.¶ During most of the history of colonial expansion and rule¶ there had been little effective resistance from the inhabitants¶ of the territories that were being colonized. Indeed, as one¶ analyst of the wars of colonial conquest noted, “by and large, it¶ would seem true that what made the machinery of European¶ troops so successful was that native troops saw fit to die, with¶ glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain.”20¶ The ease of colonial conquest, the subsequent crushing¶ military defeats imposed on the Axis powers by the superior¶ military industrial might of the Allies in World War II, and the¶ previous failure of the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations,¶ to stop Fascist aggression all served to reinforce the idea that¶ preponderance—superiority in military capability—was the¶ key both to peace through deterrence and victory in war.¶ But in the post-World War II world, new strategic realities¶ raised serious questions about assumptions regarding the¶ effectiveness of conventional military superiority. In particular,¶ the outcomes of the wars of colonial liberation, the US defeat¶ in Vietnam, and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan demonstrated¶ that in some types of conflict, military preponderance could¶ neither deter nationalist forces nor be used to defeat them.¶ The outcomes of these conflicts posed a major challenge for¶ preponderance theories.¶ Not only did the vastly superior military capabilities of¶ the colonial powers fail to deter the nationalist rebels from¶ going to war but in every case it was the nationalist forces¶ that prevailed. The colonial powers withdrew and the colonies¶ gained independence. Military preponderance was strategically¶ irrelevant.¶ Writing about US strategy in Vietnam six years before the¶ end of the war, Henry Kissinger noted:¶ We fought a military war; our opponents fought a¶ political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents¶ aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the¶ process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims¶ of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not¶ lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.21¶ For the nationalist forces, military engagements were¶ never intended to defeat the external power militarily—that¶ was impossible. The strategy was rather to seek the progressive¶ attrition of the metropole’s political capability to wage war—¶ “will” in the language of classical strategy.22 In such conflicts,¶ if the human, economic, and reputational costs to the external¶ power increase with little prospect of victory, support for the¶ war in the metropole will steadily erode and the pressure to¶ withdraw will inexorably increase.

The affirmative’s hegemony impact is reminiscent of the Algonquian monster, the Wendigo – insatiable and bloodthirsty, its only purpose is endless destruction as it struggles to maintain itself – in a similar way, hegemony is a constant process of enemy-creation – a paranoid politics towards the impossible telos of world domination – this politics is responsible both for every atrocity in the 20th century as well as the exacerbation of every modern geopolitical crisis

Cunningham 13 (Finian Cunningham, expert in international affairs specializing in the Middle East, former journalist expelled from Bahrain due to his revealing of human rights violations committed by the Western-backed regime, basically a badass, 3-11-13, “US Creates Nuclear Armed Cyber-attack Retaliation Force. Psychotic Superpower on a Hair Trigger,” <http://nsnbc.me/2013/03/11/us-creates-nuclear-armed-cyberattack-retaliation-force-psychotic-superpower-on-a-hair-trigger/>) gz

Since at least World War II, the genocidal propensity and practices of the US are proven, if not widely known, especially among its propagandized public. The atomic holocaust of hundreds of thousands of civilians at Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the beginning of the long shadow cast upon the world by this deranged superpower. For a few decades, the crazed American giant could hide behind the veil of the «Cold War» against the Soviet Union, pretending to be the protector of the «free world». If that was true, then why since the Cold War ended more than 20 years ago has there not been peace on earth? Why have conflicts proliferated to the point that there is now a permanent state of war in the world? Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan have melded into countless other US-led wars across Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The «War on Terror» and its tacit invocation of «evil Islamists» have sought to replace the «Cold War» and its bogeymen, the «evil communists». But if we set aside these narratives, then the alternative makes compelling sense and accurate explanation of events. That alternative is simply this: that the US is an imperialist warmonger whose appetite for war, plunder and hegemony is insatiable. If the US had no official enemy, it would have to invent one. The Cold War narrative can be disabused easily by the simple contradictory fact, as already mentioned, that more than 22 years after the collapse of the «evil» Soviet Union the world is no less peaceful and perhaps even more racked by belligerence and conflict. The War on Terror narrative can likewise be dismissed by the fact that the «evil Islamists» supposedly being combated were created by US and British military intelligence along with Saudi money in Afghanistan during the 1980s and are currently being supported by the West to destabilize Libya and Syria and indirectly Mali. So what we are left to deduce is a world that is continually being set at war by the US and its various surrogates. As the executive power in the global capitalist system, the US is the main protagonist in pursuing the objectives of the financial-military-industrial complex. These objectives include: subjugation of all nations – their workers, governments and industries, for the total economic and political domination by the global network of finance capitalism. In this function, of course, the US government is aided by its Western allies and the NATO military apparatus. Any nation not completely toeing the imperialist line will be targeted for attack. They include Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea. In the past, they included Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Grenada, Nicaragua, Chile and Panama. Presently, others include Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Mali undergoing attack operations. The difference between covert and overt attack by the US hegemon is only a matter of degrees. The decades-long economic sanctions on Iran, the cyber sabotage of that country’s industries and infrastructure, the assassination of nuclear scientists, deployment of terrorist proxies such as the MEK, and the repeated threat of all-out war by the US and its Israeli surrogate, could all qualify Iran as already being subjected to war and not just a future target. Likewise with Russia: the expansion of US missile systems around Russia’s borders is an act of incremental war. Likewise China: the American arming of Taiwan, relentless war gaming in the South China Sea and the stoking of territorial conflicts are all examples of where «politics is but war by other means». What history shows us is that the modern world has been turned into a lawless shooting gallery under the unhinged misrule of the United States of America. That has always been so since at least the Second World War, with more than 60 wars having been waged by Washington during that period, and countless millions killed. For decades this truth has been obscured by propaganda – the Cold War, War on Terror etc – but now the appalling stark reality is unavoidably clear. The US is at war – against the entire world.

Liberal commercial peace is a mask for a cult of violence

Neocleous 11 (Mark Neocleous, professor of the critique of the political economy (yes that is a thing) at Brunel University, PhD in philosophy, November 2011, “’O Effeminacy! Effeminacy!’ War, Masculinity and the Myth of Liberal Peace,” *European Journal of International Relations* Volume 19 Issue 1, GENDER MODIFIED OR IN CONTEXT) gz

‘O Effeminacy! Effeminacy! Who wou’d imagine this could be the Vice of such as appear no inconsiderable Men?’ (Shaftesbury, 2001 [1732], III: 113). Such was the concern of Shaftesbury in 1732. I have been arguing that this concern permeated the political discourse of 18th-century liberalism. The reason the thinkers in question thought effeminacy a vice is because they believed that, along with associated vices such as luxury, it undermined the martial spirit. As I have shown, the extent of this concern was huge. I suggest that this is also politically telling, in a number of ways.¶ First, because it reveals the belief in the necessity for strong martial spirit and sustained military values among the thinkers in question. Indeed, the liberals in question were not merely sensitive to the tradition of thought which emphasized the creative role of war in the development of civilization and the shaping of the character of human beings, but actually believed in and perpetuated this tradition. Far from perpetual peace, what was at stake in the liberal thinking of the time was a concern with how to maintain commercial order as a realm of liberty such that the virtues of civil society did not threaten the virtues of martial power. Within this, the question of how to stop the effeminacy and luxury of civilization from overawing the masculinity of military virtue and undermining the martial nature of masculine power was paramount. One might note here that this argument reinforces the feminist claim regarding classical liberalism’s patriarchal nature, pointing as it does to the unity of the masculinity required for war and the masculinity required for citizenship (Elshtain, 1987; Lloyd, 1986: 63–76). My point is that this somewhat undermines one of the historical claims made within the liberal peace thesis, namely that the conceptual underpinning of the liberal peace lies in part in the 18th-century Scottish Enlightenment’s conception of commercial ~~man~~ [person] and civil society.¶ My second suggestion is that any reasonable exercise in the history of 18th-century political thought would have shown IR theorists the need to disentangle the association of economic liberalism and peace. The association itself is a product of a link first made by the more doctrinaire ‘free traders’ of the 19th century peddling the myth of a link between peace and trade (Earle, 1990: 222, 226; Howe, 2007; Winch, 1978: 104). From there, the idea of a liberal vision of peace rooted in an image of economic order very easily became a piece of received wisdom. Too many IR theorists have accepted this received wisdom uncritically and perpetuated it unthinkingly, systematically ignoring the importance which the 18th-century liberals attached to military valour and martial virtues and which suggests that the belief that key thinkers of the liberal Enlightenment valued peace above all else is a piece of political mythology of the highest order. Some years ago David Spiro (1994) challenged some of the empirical data of the liberal peace thesis and provocatively called his paper ‘The insignificance of the liberal peace’. The problem, I suggest, is not the insignificance of the thesis but its status as a modern political myth.¶ As such, my third suggestion is that as well as debunking such myths and challenging the received wisdom of IR, a critical engagement in the history of ideas supports recent attempts to radically rethink the liberal tradition. I have elsewhere argued that liberalism’s key concept is less liberty and more security. Nowhere is this clearer than in 18th-century liberal thought, which subsumed liberty under the idea of security (Neocleous, 2000, 2008). But as Michael Shapiro (1993: 15) notes, ‘security’ in the work of Smith (and, we might add, other classical liberals) is never a reference to mere ‘defence’, but also connotes an active and militaristic practice. Liberalism as a political ideology has been committed to this active militaristic practice since its inception, which is one of the reasons why liberal states as organized political powers have turned out to be so fundamentally violent.**¶** The implications of this argument therefore go beyond merely pointing out the poor engagement with the history of political thought on the part of too many IR scholars.¶ Rather, the argument lends support to a growing body of work arguing that liberalism needs to be considered less as a doctrine inherently committed to peace and much more through the ‘ferocious violence with which it deploys techniques to penetrate and organise the dispositions of liberal subjects themselves’ (Reid, 2004: 64). In the history of ideas there has been a revival of interest in what Pocock (1975) calls the Machiavellian moment, a key aspect of which is the cultivation of military virtue as part of one’s civic duty. There is a decidedly liberal version of this through the centuries. ‘There is a kind of violence within liberalism’, notes Richard Tuck, ‘in which liberty and warfare (both civil and international conflict) were bound together’ (1999: 195). A fair amount of recent work from a range of positions and with a variety of foci lends weight to this argument, and really points us towards the idea that liberalism needs to be seen less through the lens of peace and more through the lens of war (Barkawi and Laffey, 2001; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Kochi, 2009; Losurdo, 2011; Meyer, 2008; Neocleous, 2010, 2011; Seymour, 2008; Spieker, 2011; Thorup, 2006). Far from being insignificant, the liberal peace thesis plays a crucial ideological role in masking classical liberalism’s understanding of war as the exercise of the liberal spirit.

### Poverty

Fossil fuels and the oil lobby make renewables structurally impossible – change in the system is necessary

Meisen and Krumpel, 9– President of the Global Energy Network Institute / Research-Associate at GENI (Peter and Sebastian, “Renewable Energy Potential of Latin America”, December 2009; < http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/research/renewable-energy-potential-of-latin-america/Potential%20of%20Renewables%20in%20Latin%20America-edited-12-16%20\_Letter\_.pdf>)//Beddow

In reality the situation of renewable energies in Latin America is not as positive or optimistic as we might want to think, or as certain statistical data lead us to believe. There are many problems associated with the implementation of renewables as well as their impact on the environment and society. In this context, the main problem for renewable energies in Latin America is in the way energy and development policies have been constructed. In most cases, energy policies and strategies in Latin America have excluded renewables and other alternatives as being too costly and technologically unfeasible, or by arguing that the country does not have the capabilities to implement them. The easiest explanation for this, and one which is usually mentioned, is the lack of incentive and foresight. Since the region has an abundance of resources such as oil, gas, and hydro, it is in general easier, cheaper and more technically feasible to keep exploiting conventional energy resources than to in vest in renewable energies or create appropriate renewable energy policies. Another common explanation is that the development of renewable energies clash wi th the interest of powerful players, particularly large energy companies, and, therefore, there are few incentives to promote them.

Erased from the history of hegemony is its resurgence through the neoliberal shock treatment in Chile which eliminated the people’s culture, freedom and livelihood to set up an authoritarian regime willing to reduce their country to a lab for the Chicago Boys. In the wake of the US defeat in Vietnam and the subsequent stagnation of growth, the US turned to the neoimperialism of neoliberal reforms abroad and at home to secure its future. These reforms served to roll back all protections in place which insulated the poor from the worst excesses of capitalism. Neoliberalism relies on the creation of crises, bubbles and eventually collapses; neoliberalism is predicated on imperialism, colonialism, classism and racism. We must retell the story of hegemony to include those discontinuities which are buried by the official history of liberal hegemony

**Barder, 13**

/Alexander D., Department of Political Studies & Public Administration, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon, PhD in Political Theory from John Hopkins, “American Hegemony Comes Home: The Chilean Laboratory and the Neoliberalization of the United States” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 2013 38: 103 originally published online 22 April 2013, DOI: 10.1177/0304375413486331/

As I argued above, American liberal hegemony entered a profound crisis in the 1970s as a result of intracapitalist competition and the consequences of the American defeat in the Vietnam War. Both of these factors are missing in Ikenberry’s narrative of American international hegemony, which only focuses on certain aspects of what Arrighi calls America’s terminal crisis. What is missing in Ikenberry’s work is any sense of the reassertion of American hegemony beginning in the 1970s that culminated in the Reagan/Thatcher monetarist counterrevolution. In Ikenberry’s framework, as mentioned above, the New Deal era was internationalized in the aftermath of the Second World War as a way of mitigating the worst excesses of unregulated capitalism to promote social and economic welfare. Liberal hierarchy here works, as I argued above, unidirectionally from American embedded liberalism and its progressive instantiation in various international organizations and through the socialization of states into this American-led international order. What remains unexplored are the reverse impacts: how patterns of international hegemony create the conditions for domestic institutional change. What were the domestic consequences for the reassertion of American hegemony in the mid- to late 1970s for American domestic institutions? How, in other words, did the political–economic discourse go from the Nixonian ‘‘We are all Keynesians’’ to a decade later the famous Thatcherite mantra ‘‘There is no alternative’’ (TINA, i.e., There Is No Alternative to the radical implementation of monetarist policies and the contraction of the state)? Indeed, at a party conference in 1980, Thatcher explicitly calls for discipline and fortitude in the face of a grave economic/inflationary crisis. At the same time, she insists that her policies are to be considered ‘‘normal, sound, and honest.’’57 In other words, Thatcher promotes the inevitability and naturalness of her program at the same time as she stresses the urgency of its adoption. The depoliticized and inevitable necessity for the neoliberalization of the United States and the United Kingdom is part of what Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant have shown to be the the manifestation of a vulgate borne out ‘‘of a new type of imperialism’’. As they further add, [This vulgate’s] effects are all the more powerful and pernicious in that it is promoted not only by the partisans of the neoliberal revolution who, under cover of ‘modernization’, intend to remake the world by sweeping away the social and economic conquests of a century of social struggles, henceforth depicted as so many archaisms and obstacles to the emergent new order, but also by cultural producers (researchers, writers and artists) and left-wing activists, the vast majority of whom still think of themselves as progressives.58 Bourdieu and Wacquant point to how the ‘‘cultural imperialism’’ of neoliberal discourse has seeped into the very vocabulary of economic governance, making it appear entirely natural and self-evident. As they observe, ‘‘the automatic effect of the international circulation of ideas, . . . tends, by its very logic, to conceal their original conditions of production and signification,

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the play of preliminary definitions and scholastic deductions replaces the contingency of denegated sociological necessities with the appearance of logical necessity and tends to mask the historical roots of a whole set of questions and notions . . . .’’59 Indeed, the active concealment of the origin of these neoliberal ideas and how they came into practice, I claim, points to how much neoliberal discourse forgets its origins in the crucibles of Latin American neo-imperial experiments.60 What I wish to show is how these neoliberal ideas, as part of a larger project to reassert American hegemony, were in fact initially deployed in the experimental crucibles of South America before being legitimized and normalized for implementation in the United States.61 To see then the imbrications between the reassertion of American hegemony in the 1970s and the neoliberalization of the American domestic political economy, it is important to recall that the crisis of legitimacy provoked by America’s war of attrition in Southeast Asia coincided with the emergence of novel social movements that challenged the social mores of American society. The civil rights movement, the feminist movement, the sexual revolution, and the student rebellions against the war effort revealed latent trends of racism, sexism, and other forms of social domination at the heart of American society. These movements, as Harvey notes, ‘‘challenged the traditional structure of networked class relations.’’62 Domestic emancipatory developments during the 1960s and 1970s proved to be part of, what Arrighi describes as, the ‘‘highly depressing experience for the bourgeoisie of the West’’ because it fundamentally called into question the authority of the state and the ruling classes throughout the capitalist world.63 While the 1960s represented an enormous surge in democratic participation across the developed world, in the United States especially with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Samuel Huntington would argue in 1976, such an expansion, along with an increase in governmental expenditure of social welfare, ‘‘produced a substantial . . . . decrease in governmental authority.’’64 This happened because democratic participation, for Huntington, increased ideological polarization, which in turn undermined governmental authority when the results of governmental action did not fulfill expectations. Indeed, the significant changes in fiscal, monetary, and social policies in the late 1970s were reflective of this perceived need to reassert domestic governmental authority. The Reagan administration then worked toward directly challenging the central collective compact between labor, management, and the state that the New Deal established in order to recreate a ‘‘good business environment’’ for continuous capital accumulation. 65 As David Harvey argues, unleashing financial power proved to be a convenient way to ‘‘discipline working-class movements,’’ essentially reasserting a form of class power over a society riveted by social stratification and the loss of governmental authority.66 But how was this process legitimized in the first place? Understanding what Jaime Peck terms the neoliberalization of the state necessitates a detour through Chile during the 1970s.67 The ‘‘crudely imperial’’ policies of the United States in Latin America during the 1970s proved to be a crucial feature of the neoliberalization of the United States itself. The experimental implementation of economic orthodoxy—the deregulation of state power, financialization, or the unrestrained practice of financial and trading markets, privatization and the destruction of forms of social solidarity such as trade unions—established Chile as the first largescale neoliberal laboratory. Chile subsequently legitimized neoliberal discourse that would prove to be highly malleable in different contexts. ‘‘The Chilean case,’’ as Juan Gabriel Valde´s argues, ‘‘became a model, a unique phenomenon that did not stem from any historical experience. Rather, it originated directly from what the Chicago Boys termed ‘‘economic science’’: a science to be found mostly in their textbooks.’’68 It is the implementation and experience of neoliberal revolution that proved crucial for its normalization as a valid or ‘‘tried and true’’ theory for subsequent implementation in the United States. Under conditions of what later became known as shock treatment, Latin America during the 1970s proved to be the crucible for experimenting with the ideas put forward by the Chicago School of economic theory. In Latin America, economic regulatory mechanisms were radically and quickly transformed in favor of market-based solutions characteristic of neo-imperial reassertion.69 The Chicago School of economic theory, embodied in the writings and teachings of Milton Friedman, who won the Nobel Prize in 1976, advocated the deregulation of markets and the contraction of the state as a way of promoting individual freedom and wealth.70 Following Friedrich von Hayek, Friedman and other neoconservative proponents believed that markets in general possess an internal rationality that nullifies the potential for state domination. The ideas emanating from the Chicago School of economics depoliticized economic questions by emphasizing how ‘‘markets’’ were able to address substantive political problems. Neoliberalization, Wendy Brown argues following Michel Foucault, takes for granted that ‘‘The political sphere, along with every other dimension of contemporary existence, is submitted to an economic rationality . . . [and that] all dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market rationality.’’71 Neoliberalization was then much more than simply the financialization of the international and domestic economies, as Arrighi argues, but the attempt at completely rewiring the political–economic form of American liberal hegemony. The novelty of neoliberalization, as Peck argues, ‘‘denotes the repeated (necessity for) renewal and reinvention of a project that could never be fixed as a stable formula, and which has lurched through moments of innovation, overreach, correction, and crisis.’’72 This political–economic project was first concretely experimented with in Chile during its own internal crises of the 1970s.73 What was significant in this case was that the neoliberal experiment occurred in the aftermath of the American-influenced coup d’e´tat by General Augusto Pinochet on September 11, 1973. The election of the leftist Salvador Allende in 1970 was deemed by the Nixon administration to be a grave threat to American strategic and corporate interests in the Western hemisphere. National security advisor Henry Kissinger argued at a meeting of the National Security Council [NSC] that Allende’s program ‘‘would pose some very serious threats to our interests and position in the hemisphere, and would affect developments and our relations to them elsewhere in the world.’’ Chile, Kissinger continued, could ‘‘become part of a Soviet/Socialist world, not only philosophically but in terms of power dynamics; and it might constitute a support base and entry point for expansion of Soviet and Cuban presence and activity in the region.’’74 In this Cold War geopolitical context, what Valde´s calls the ‘‘ideological transfer’’ of Chicago School economic ideas through their progenitors, the Chicago Boys, was perceived transnationally by American and Chilean elites as a way of countering the legitimacy of socialist/Marxist ideas. The Chicago Boys—Chilean graduate students at the University of Chicago, whose studies were financed in part by the Ford Foundation and the State Department, and who would later become faculty members in various economics departments in Chile—embarked on the radical transformation of the Chilean economy.75 As Mario Sznajder writes, Chile had become a kind of socio-economic laboratory in which a neoliberal experiment was being carried out with scant political hinderance. In the second half of the 1970s, the military government gave priority to the economic experiment, relying on its success to legitimise the future political framework of limited democracy, which in turn would provide the required guarantee for the survival and defence of the neoliberal model.76 This radical transformation was largely justified as a reaction against everything that Salvador Allende’s socialist economic program stood for. What was characterized as La vı´a chilena al socialismo, social spending to alleviate poverty, protection of domestic industries, a moratorium of foreign debt repayment, made the Nixon administration so fearful of its turn toward the Soviet Union.77 For the purposes of ‘‘shocking’’ the economic system in order to push for dramatic changes that the Chicago boys would otherwise have been unable to accomplish, authoritarianism and economic reform occurred hand in hand. The result was that what were ostensibly political decisions, the determination of the contours of the socioeconomic order was not determined democratically, but rather by economic experts.78 The authoritarianism of the Chilean coup was characterized by the arrest of over 13,000 people deemed ‘‘Marxist subversives’’; grave abuses of human rights occurred over a prolonged period of time, including executions of political dissents.79 Nonetheless, with the economy in a shambles in the aftermath of the coup, Chile was an ideal place for experimenting with ideas that had been gestating among the Chicago Boys and their teachers for many years. First and foremost, these economists ‘‘radically altered the Chilean economic paradigm, bringing it into line not just with military self-interest in retaining control but also with the general tendencies of the world economy.’’80 ‘‘The goal [of the Chicago Boys attempt at reform],’’ as Valde´s further adds, ‘‘was nothing less than the transformation of the state, of customs, and of culture’’ but especially, as Pinochet himself remarked, to engender a complete ‘‘change in mentality.’’81 The explicit purpose of economic transformation was to tame the hyperinflation of the preceding years, but it proved to be an opportunity to implement ‘‘a radical economic liberalization program based on the indiscriminate use of market mechanisms, the dismantling and reduction of the state, deregulation of the financial sector, and a discourse that ascribed to market forces the ability to solve practically any problem in society.’’82 As a result of the privatization of finance and the lowering of tariffs and taxation, Chile became, as one New York Times journalist characterized it, ‘‘a banker’s delight.’’ According to this journalist, the Chicago Boys economically and politically cemented Chile’s position in the US imperial orbit.83 This transformation of the Chilean economy along Chicago School theories, for the purposes of aligning it, as Valde´s argues, with the world economy captured the imagination of a whole host of academic economists, journalists, and policy makers in the United States and in various international organizations: From the mid-1970s onward, the country enjoyed privileged treatment by the IMF and the commercial banks. Chile was doubtless the country most visited and commented upon by journalists from the international conservative press, as well as by a distinguished list of academics headed by the most prominent members of the Chicago School of Economics, including Milton Friedman himself. The reason for this interest is easy to comprehend: Chile had become the first and most famous example of applying the rules of economic orthodoxy to a developing country. Foreign trade was liberalized, prices were freed, state companies were privatized, the financial sector was deregulated, and state functions were drastically reduced.84 A Barron’s editorial in 1980 quoted Arnold Harberger, a professor at the time at the University of Chicago who was perhaps even more influential than Milton Friedman with the Chicago Boys, as arguing that the Chilean reforms were ‘‘the most important reforms made in the underdeveloped world in recent history.’’ As the editorial further adds quoting an anonymous colleague of Harberger’s: ‘‘The economics textbooks say that’s the way the world should work, but where else do they practice it?’’85 Implied here is that the economic programof the Chicago Boys is suitable for implementation throughout the developing world as a way of generating economic growth and efficiency.86 But there is also a certain implication for what needs to be done within the United States itself that was at the time faced with a growing crisis of stagflation. Of course, the obvious authoritarianism of the Pinochet government and its breaches of international human rights conventions was a significant source of contention and even opprobrium; Friedman himself would be tagged as complicit in legitimizing the Pinochet regime through his own trip to Chile in 1975 and his meeting with Pinochet. His awarding of the Nobel Prize in 1976 was accompanied with protests. But as Corey Robin has recently uncovered, in 1981 American academics including Friedman, Hayek, James M. Buchanan, and Arnold Harberger, along with their counterparts from many other countries, met in Vin˜a del Mar under the auspices of the Mont Pelerin Society, to demonstrate the effectiveness of Chilean market reforms and the need to learn its lessons for the United States itself. The inherent authoritarian setting in Chile should not be seen as anything detrimental to the neoliberal project. On the contrary, as Robin cites Eric Brodin’s original commentary on the Vin˜a del Mar conference, ‘‘what is politically possible in authoritarian Chile, may not be possible in a republic with a congress filled with ‘‘gypsy moths’’ for whom political expediency often takes precedence over economic realities, especially in an election year.’’87 Again, implied here is a certain perception that a reassertion of governmental authority within the United States is necessary to address domestic and international political–economic questions. The Chilean example represented a success story for a reinvigorated conservative movement in the United States and the United Kingdom during the mid- to late 1970s. In 1981, Hayek himself would speak of Chile as ‘‘a great success’’ and predicted that ‘‘The world shall come to regard the recovery of Chile as one of the great economic miracles of our time.’’88 Chile became the decisive laboratory for the establishment, more generally, of a transnational post-Fordist economic order which emphasized flexibility, innovation, and creative destruction. This new order replaced the Bretton Woods currency framework by privileging the free flow of finance capital as a way of restructuring and disciplining various internal economies. The transformation of internal economic structures by finance capital was accompanied by a general sentiment that excessive popular democracy is detrimental to economic rights and liberties and that market rationality would best determine the distribution of wealth. The neoliberalization of Chile encapsulated the hopes and agenda of American’s conservatives to privatize a significant portion of the state to market forces, to deregulate financial services and lower taxation, and above all, to suppress the power of trade unions. However, this domestic project to promote economic freedom at home and abroad was fundamentally connected to the restoration of American hegemony. The Reagan revolution in the United States largely rested on the dual program of domestic economic neoliberalization and a pseudo-Keynesian massive armaments buildup. ‘‘The effect of what seemed to be a confused economic policy was,’’ as Grandin argues, ‘‘in retrospect, a cohesive transformation of American society and diplomacy—the institutionalizing of a perpetual system of global austerity that rendered political liberalism, both domestic and international, not viable.’’89 Arrighi argues that tight monetary policies were designed to resurrect confidence in the United States and its currency. However, austerity had significant repercussions for American domestic industry and led to a significant dismantling of trade unionism, an overarching neoconservative political goal. The great recession of the early 1980s was at the same time an engineered shock treatment that was designed to roll back inflation to the detriment of state welfare, while accentuating class power. Taxation changes primarily favoredwealthy classes and financial deregulation opened up finance capital for enormous speculative bubbles over the subsequent thirty years. The effect of this program of neoliberalization conjoined with the Reagan ‘‘rollback’’ of Soviet influence depoliticized such economic ‘‘shock’’ transformations at home and abroad. The neoliberalization of the state and society in the United States and the United Kingdom represents the normalization of pervious shock treatments experimented first and foremost within the Chilean neo-imperial crucible. This normalization of radical economic theories through hegemonic international circuits such as the IMF, the World Bank, academics, journalists, various semiprivate think tanks in the West, gave rise to what Bourdieu and Wacquant have termed a neoliberal vulgate that legitimizes a depoliticized program for structural reform across not only the global South but also within the North as the only viable program to tackle the twin economic problems of growth and inflation. As opposed to Ikenberry who draws a straight line from 1945 to the present without so much as noting the significance of the crisis of American hegemony in the 1970s, these years proved pivotal for a reassertion of hegemony through domestic and international (i.e., throughout the global South) neoliberalization. This reassertion could not be accomplished by military means, as demonstrated in Vietnam; it had to come through the radical transformation of domestic socioeconomic configurations that would privilege specific classes that would realign the South within America’s neo-imperial orbit. But what also needs to be recognized is that this global American hegemonic reassertion was intimately tied to domestic (counterrevolutionary) changes beginning in the 1980s. This conjunction between the international and the domestic is more clearly seen in how ideas, norms, and practices are experimented with in certain spaces, travel across international hierarchical circuits, and return as normalized and legitimized.

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**Their failure to recognize privilege as speaking subjects takes out any solvency and means there’s only a risk of a link.**

**Chow 93** (Rey Chow, professor of English and comparative literature and director of the comparative literature program at the University of California, Writing Diaspora: tactics of intervention in contemporary cultural studies, p. 118-9)

For "third world" intellectuals, the lures of diaspora consist in this masked hegemony. As in the case of what I call masculinist positions in the China field, their resort to "minority discourse," including the discourse of class and gender struggles, veils their own fatherhood over the "ethnics" at home even while it continues to legitimize them as "ethnics" and "minorities" in the West. In their hands, minority discourse and class struggle, especially when they take the name of another nation, another culture, another sex, or another body, turn into signifiers whose major function is that of discursive exchange for the intellectuals' self-profit. Like "the people," "real people," "the populace," "the peasants," "the poor," "the homeless," and all such names, these signifiers work insofar as they gesture toward another place (the lack in discourse-construction) that is "authentic" but that cannot be admitted into the circuit of exchange. . What happens eventually is that this "third world" that is produced, circulated, and purchased by "third world" intellectuals in the cosmopolitan diasporic space will be exported "back home" in the form of values—intangible goods—in such a way as to obstruct the development of the native industry. To be sure, one can perhaps no longer even speak of a "native industry" as such in the multinational corporate postmodernity, but it remains for these intellectuals to face up to their truthful relation to those "objects of study" behind which they can easily hide— as voyeurs, as "fellow victims," and as self-appointed custodians. Hence the necessity to read and write against the lures of diaspora: Any attempt to deal with "women" or the "oppressed classes" in the "third world" that does not at the same time come to terms with the historical conditions of its own articulation is bound to \* repeat the exploitativeness that used to and still characterizes most "exchanges" between "West" and "East." Such attempts will also be expediently assimilated within the plenitude of the hegemonic establishment, with all the rewards that that entails. No one can do without some such rewards. What one can do without is the illusion that, through privileged speech, one is helping to save the wretched of the earth.

Your role as a judge is to interrogate how we should deal with our privileged positions which allow us to speak in the first place.  
Chow 1993

/Rey, Professor Comparative Lit at Brown, “Writing Diaspora” p 15-17 google books/

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but **how they can resist**, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against **a hegemony which already includes them** and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, **many** deep-rooted, **politically reactionary forces return** to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested **claims** **of oppression and victimization** that **are used** merely **to guilt-trip and to control**; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises **remain unquestioned**. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are **battles of words**. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly **not** directly **changing the** downtrodden **lives of those who seek** their **survival** in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate **from their** “oppositional” **viewpoint**, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

### A2: Framework

Ceding imagination to the state effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – choose to confront your role in violence

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia \_ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

Roleplaying = passivity

Antonio 95 (Robert J Antonio, PhD in sociology, professor of sociology at the University of Kansas, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 101 Number 1, GENDER MODIFIED)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass disci- pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83).¶ The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?¶ A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others."¶ Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great ~~man~~ [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

## 1NR

**Barder, 13**

/Alexander D., Department of Political Studies & Public Administration, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon, PhD in Political Theory from John Hopkins, “American Hegemony Comes Home: The Chilean Laboratory and the Neoliberalization of the United States” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 2013 38: 103 originally published online 22 April 2013, DOI: 10.1177/0304375413486331/

As I argued above, American liberal hegemony entered a profound crisis in the 1970s as a result of intracapitalist competition and the consequences of the American defeat in the Vietnam War. Both of these factors are missing in Ikenberry’s narrative of American international hegemony, which only focuses on certain aspects of what Arrighi calls America’s terminal crisis. What is missing in Ikenberry’s work is any sense of the reassertion of American hegemony beginning in the 1970s that culminated in the Reagan/Thatcher monetarist counterrevolution. In Ikenberry’s framework, as mentioned above, the New Deal era was internationalized in the aftermath of the Second World War as a way of mitigating the worst excesses of unregulated capitalism to promote social and economic welfare. Liberal hierarchy here works, as I argued above, unidirectionally from American embedded liberalism and its progressive instantiation in various international organizations and through the socialization of states into this American-led international order. What remains unexplored are the reverse impacts: how patterns of international hegemony create the conditions for domestic institutional change. What were the domestic consequences for the reassertion of American hegemony in the mid- to late 1970s for American domestic institutions? How, in other words, did the political–economic discourse go from the Nixonian ‘‘We are all Keynesians’’ to a decade later the famous Thatcherite mantra ‘‘There is no alternative’’ (TINA, i.e., There Is No Alternative to the radical implementation of monetarist policies and the contraction of the state)? Indeed, at a party conference in 1980, Thatcher explicitly calls for discipline and fortitude in the face of a grave economic/inflationary crisis. At the same time, she insists that her policies are to be considered ‘‘normal, sound, and honest.’’57 In other words, Thatcher promotes the inevitability and naturalness of her program at the same time as she stresses the urgency of its adoption. The depoliticized and inevitable necessity for the neoliberalization of the United States and the United Kingdom is part of what Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant have shown to be the the manifestation of a vulgate borne out ‘‘of a new type of imperialism’’. As they further add, [This vulgate’s] effects are all the more powerful and pernicious in that it is promoted not only by the partisans of the neoliberal revolution who, under cover of ‘modernization’, intend to remake the world by sweeping away the social and economic conquests of a century of social struggles, henceforth depicted as so many archaisms and obstacles to the emergent new order, but also by cultural producers (researchers, writers and artists) and left-wing activists, the vast majority of whom still think of themselves as progressives.58 Bourdieu and Wacquant point to how the ‘‘cultural imperialism’’ of neoliberal discourse has seeped into the very vocabulary of economic governance, making it appear entirely natural and self-evident. As they observe, ‘‘the automatic effect of the international circulation of ideas, . . . tends, by its very logic, to conceal their original conditions of production and signification,

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the play of preliminary definitions and scholastic deductions replaces the contingency of denegated sociological necessities with the appearance of logical necessity and tends to mask the historical roots of a whole set of questions and notions . . . .’’59 Indeed, the active concealment of the origin of these neoliberal ideas and how they came into practice, I claim, points to how much neoliberal discourse forgets its origins in the crucibles of Latin American neo-imperial experiments.60 What I wish to show is how these neoliberal ideas, as part of a larger project to reassert American hegemony, were in fact initially deployed in the experimental crucibles of South America before being legitimized and normalized for implementation in the United States.61 To see then the imbrications between the reassertion of American hegemony in the 1970s and the neoliberalization of the American domestic political economy, it is important to recall that the crisis of legitimacy provoked by America’s war of attrition in Southeast Asia coincided with the emergence of novel social movements that challenged the social mores of American society. The civil rights movement, the feminist movement, the sexual revolution, and the student rebellions against the war effort revealed latent trends of racism, sexism, and other forms of social domination at the heart of American society. These movements, as Harvey notes, ‘‘challenged the traditional structure of networked class relations.’’62 Domestic emancipatory developments during the 1960s and 1970s proved to be part of, what Arrighi describes as, the ‘‘highly depressing experience for the bourgeoisie of the West’’ because it fundamentally called into question the authority of the state and the ruling classes throughout the capitalist world.63 While the 1960s represented an enormous surge in democratic participation across the developed world, in the United States especially with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Samuel Huntington would argue in 1976, such an expansion, along with an increase in governmental expenditure of social welfare, ‘‘produced a substantial . . . . decrease in governmental authority.’’64 This happened because democratic participation, for Huntington, increased ideological polarization, which in turn undermined governmental authority when the results of governmental action did not fulfill expectations. Indeed, the significant changes in fiscal, monetary, and social policies in the late 1970s were reflective of this perceived need to reassert domestic governmental authority. The Reagan administration then worked toward directly challenging the central collective compact between labor, management, and the state that the New Deal established in order to recreate a ‘‘good business environment’’ for continuous capital accumulation. 65 As David Harvey argues, unleashing financial power proved to be a convenient way to ‘‘discipline working-class movements,’’ essentially reasserting a form of class power over a society riveted by social stratification and the loss of governmental authority.66 But how was this process legitimized in the first place? Understanding what Jaime Peck terms the neoliberalization of the state necessitates a detour through Chile during the 1970s.67 The ‘‘crudely imperial’’ policies of the United States in Latin America during the 1970s proved to be a crucial feature of the neoliberalization of the United States itself. The experimental implementation of economic orthodoxy—the deregulation of state power, financialization, or the unrestrained practice of financial and trading markets, privatization and the destruction of forms of social solidarity such as trade unions—established Chile as the first largescale neoliberal laboratory. Chile subsequently legitimized neoliberal discourse that would prove to be highly malleable in different contexts. ‘‘The Chilean case,’’ as Juan Gabriel Valde´s argues, ‘‘became a model, a unique phenomenon that did not stem from any historical experience. Rather, it originated directly from what the Chicago Boys termed ‘‘economic science’’: a science to be found mostly in their textbooks.’’68 It is the implementation and experience of neoliberal revolution that proved crucial for its normalization as a valid or ‘‘tried and true’’ theory for subsequent implementation in the United States. Under conditions of what later became known as shock treatment, Latin America during the 1970s proved to be the crucible for experimenting with the ideas put forward by the Chicago School of economic theory. In Latin America, economic regulatory mechanisms were radically and quickly transformed in favor of market-based solutions characteristic of neo-imperial reassertion.69 The Chicago School of economic theory, embodied in the writings and teachings of Milton Friedman, who won the Nobel Prize in 1976, advocated the deregulation of markets and the contraction of the state as a way of promoting individual freedom and wealth.70 Following Friedrich von Hayek, Friedman and other neoconservative proponents believed that markets in general possess an internal rationality that nullifies the potential for state domination. The ideas emanating from the Chicago School of economics depoliticized economic questions by emphasizing how ‘‘markets’’ were able to address substantive political problems. Neoliberalization, Wendy Brown argues following Michel Foucault, takes for granted that ‘‘The political sphere, along with every other dimension of contemporary existence, is submitted to an economic rationality . . . [and that] all dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market rationality.’’71 Neoliberalization was then much more than simply the financialization of the international and domestic economies, as Arrighi argues, but the attempt at completely rewiring the political–economic form of American liberal hegemony. The novelty of neoliberalization, as Peck argues, ‘‘denotes the repeated (necessity for) renewal and reinvention of a project that could never be fixed as a stable formula, and which has lurched through moments of innovation, overreach, correction, and crisis.’’72 This political–economic project was first concretely experimented with in Chile during its own internal crises of the 1970s.73 What was significant in this case was that the neoliberal experiment occurred in the aftermath of the American-influenced coup d’e´tat by General Augusto Pinochet on September 11, 1973. The election of the leftist Salvador Allende in 1970 was deemed by the Nixon administration to be a grave threat to American strategic and corporate interests in the Western hemisphere. National security advisor Henry Kissinger argued at a meeting of the National Security Council [NSC] that Allende’s program ‘‘would pose some very serious threats to our interests and position in the hemisphere, and would affect developments and our relations to them elsewhere in the world.’’ Chile, Kissinger continued, could ‘‘become part of a Soviet/Socialist world, not only philosophically but in terms of power dynamics; and it might constitute a support base and entry point for expansion of Soviet and Cuban presence and activity in the region.’’74 In this Cold War geopolitical context, what Valde´s calls the ‘‘ideological transfer’’ of Chicago School economic ideas through their progenitors, the Chicago Boys, was perceived transnationally by American and Chilean elites as a way of countering the legitimacy of socialist/Marxist ideas. The Chicago Boys—Chilean graduate students at the University of Chicago, whose studies were financed in part by the Ford Foundation and the State Department, and who would later become faculty members in various economics departments in Chile—embarked on the radical transformation of the Chilean economy.75 As Mario Sznajder writes, Chile had become a kind of socio-economic laboratory in which a neoliberal experiment was being carried out with scant political hinderance. In the second half of the 1970s, the military government gave priority to the economic experiment, relying on its success to legitimise the future political framework of limited democracy, which in turn would provide the required guarantee for the survival and defence of the neoliberal model.76 This radical transformation was largely justified as a reaction against everything that Salvador Allende’s socialist economic program stood for. What was characterized as La vı´a chilena al socialismo, social spending to alleviate poverty, protection of domestic industries, a moratorium of foreign debt repayment, made the Nixon administration so fearful of its turn toward the Soviet Union.77 For the purposes of ‘‘shocking’’ the economic system in order to push for dramatic changes that the Chicago boys would otherwise have been unable to accomplish, authoritarianism and economic reform occurred hand in hand. The result was that what were ostensibly political decisions, the determination of the contours of the socioeconomic order was not determined democratically, but rather by economic experts.78 The authoritarianism of the Chilean coup was characterized by the arrest of over 13,000 people deemed ‘‘Marxist subversives’’; grave abuses of human rights occurred over a prolonged period of time, including executions of political dissents.79 Nonetheless, with the economy in a shambles in the aftermath of the coup, Chile was an ideal place for experimenting with ideas that had been gestating among the Chicago Boys and their teachers for many years. First and foremost, these economists ‘‘radically altered the Chilean economic paradigm, bringing it into line not just with military self-interest in retaining control but also with the general tendencies of the world economy.’’80 ‘‘The goal [of the Chicago Boys attempt at reform],’’ as Valde´s further adds, ‘‘was nothing less than the transformation of the state, of customs, and of culture’’ but especially, as Pinochet himself remarked, to engender a complete ‘‘change in mentality.’’81 The explicit purpose of economic transformation was to tame the hyperinflation of the preceding years, but it proved to be an opportunity to implement ‘‘a radical economic liberalization program based on the indiscriminate use of market mechanisms, the dismantling and reduction of the state, deregulation of the financial sector, and a discourse that ascribed to market forces the ability to solve practically any problem in society.’’82 As a result of the privatization of finance and the lowering of tariffs and taxation, Chile became, as one New York Times journalist characterized it, ‘‘a banker’s delight.’’ According to this journalist, the Chicago Boys economically and politically cemented Chile’s position in the US imperial orbit.83 This transformation of the Chilean economy along Chicago School theories, for the purposes of aligning it, as Valde´s argues, with the world economy captured the imagination of a whole host of academic economists, journalists, and policy makers in the United States and in various international organizations: From the mid-1970s onward, the country enjoyed privileged treatment by the IMF and the commercial banks. Chile was doubtless the country most visited and commented upon by journalists from the international conservative press, as well as by a distinguished list of academics headed by the most prominent members of the Chicago School of Economics, including Milton Friedman himself. The reason for this interest is easy to comprehend: Chile had become the first and most famous example of applying the rules of economic orthodoxy to a developing country. Foreign trade was liberalized, prices were freed, state companies were privatized, the financial sector was deregulated, and state functions were drastically reduced.84 A Barron’s editorial in 1980 quoted Arnold Harberger, a professor at the time at the University of Chicago who was perhaps even more influential than Milton Friedman with the Chicago Boys, as arguing that the Chilean reforms were ‘‘the most important reforms made in the underdeveloped world in recent history.’’ As the editorial further adds quoting an anonymous colleague of Harberger’s: ‘‘The economics textbooks say that’s the way the world should work, but where else do they practice it?’’85 Implied here is that the economic programof the Chicago Boys is suitable for implementation throughout the developing world as a way of generating economic growth and efficiency.86 But there is also a certain implication for what needs to be done within the United States itself that was at the time faced with a growing crisis of stagflation. Of course, the obvious authoritarianism of the Pinochet government and its breaches of international human rights conventions was a significant source of contention and even opprobrium; Friedman himself would be tagged as complicit in legitimizing the Pinochet regime through his own trip to Chile in 1975 and his meeting with Pinochet. His awarding of the Nobel Prize in 1976 was accompanied with protests. But as Corey Robin has recently uncovered, in 1981 American academics including Friedman, Hayek, James M. Buchanan, and Arnold Harberger, along with their counterparts from many other countries, met in Vin˜a del Mar under the auspices of the Mont Pelerin Society, to demonstrate the effectiveness of Chilean market reforms and the need to learn its lessons for the United States itself. The inherent authoritarian setting in Chile should not be seen as anything detrimental to the neoliberal project. On the contrary, as Robin cites Eric Brodin’s original commentary on the Vin˜a del Mar conference, ‘‘what is politically possible in authoritarian Chile, may not be possible in a republic with a congress filled with ‘‘gypsy moths’’ for whom political expediency often takes precedence over economic realities, especially in an election year.’’87 Again, implied here is a certain perception that a reassertion of governmental authority within the United States is necessary to address domestic and international political–economic questions. The Chilean example represented a success story for a reinvigorated conservative movement in the United States and the United Kingdom during the mid- to late 1970s. In 1981, Hayek himself would speak of Chile as ‘‘a great success’’ and predicted that ‘‘The world shall come to regard the recovery of Chile as one of the great economic miracles of our time.’’88 Chile became the decisive laboratory for the establishment, more generally, of a transnational post-Fordist economic order which emphasized flexibility, innovation, and creative destruction. This new order replaced the Bretton Woods currency framework by privileging the free flow of finance capital as a way of restructuring and disciplining various internal economies. The transformation of internal economic structures by finance capital was accompanied by a general sentiment that excessive popular democracy is detrimental to economic rights and liberties and that market rationality would best determine the distribution of wealth. The neoliberalization of Chile encapsulated the hopes and agenda of American’s conservatives to privatize a significant portion of the state to market forces, to deregulate financial services and lower taxation, and above all, to suppress the power of trade unions. However, this domestic project to promote economic freedom at home and abroad was fundamentally connected to the restoration of American hegemony. The Reagan revolution in the United States largely rested on the dual program of domestic economic neoliberalization and a pseudo-Keynesian massive armaments buildup. ‘‘The effect of what seemed to be a confused economic policy was,’’ as Grandin argues, ‘‘in retrospect, a cohesive transformation of American society and diplomacy—the institutionalizing of a perpetual system of global austerity that rendered political liberalism, both domestic and international, not viable.’’89 Arrighi argues that tight monetary policies were designed to resurrect confidence in the United States and its currency. However, austerity had significant repercussions for American domestic industry and led to a significant dismantling of trade unionism, an overarching neoconservative political goal. The great recession of the early 1980s was at the same time an engineered shock treatment that was designed to roll back inflation to the detriment of state welfare, while accentuating class power. Taxation changes primarily favoredwealthy classes and financial deregulation opened up finance capital for enormous speculative bubbles over the subsequent thirty years. The effect of this program of neoliberalization conjoined with the Reagan ‘‘rollback’’ of Soviet influence depoliticized such economic ‘‘shock’’ transformations at home and abroad. The neoliberalization of the state and society in the United States and the United Kingdom represents the normalization of pervious shock treatments experimented first and foremost within the Chilean neo-imperial crucible. This normalization of radical economic theories through hegemonic international circuits such as the IMF, the World Bank, academics, journalists, various semiprivate think tanks in the West, gave rise to what Bourdieu and Wacquant have termed a neoliberal vulgate that legitimizes a depoliticized program for structural reform across not only the global South but also within the North as the only viable program to tackle the twin economic problems of growth and inflation. As opposed to Ikenberry who draws a straight line from 1945 to the present without so much as noting the significance of the crisis of American hegemony in the 1970s, these years proved pivotal for a reassertion of hegemony through domestic and international (i.e., throughout the global South) neoliberalization. This reassertion could not be accomplished by military means, as demonstrated in Vietnam; it had to come through the radical transformation of domestic socioeconomic configurations that would privilege specific classes that would realign the South within America’s neo-imperial orbit. But what also needs to be recognized is that this global American hegemonic reassertion was intimately tied to domestic (counterrevolutionary) changes beginning in the 1980s. This conjunction between the international and the domestic is more clearly seen in how ideas, norms, and practices are experimented with in certain spaces, travel across international hierarchical circuits, and return as normalized and legitimized.